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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case

This matter comes before this Court on the Defendant's appeal from the District Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order on appeal, affirming the trial court's denial of the Defendant's
Motion to Suppress.
Procedural History

On April 24,2006, Christopher P. Martin, was charged by way of Idaho Uniform Citation
with Driving Without Privileges, a third offense within five (5) years, in contravention of Idaho
Code $5 18-8001(5), a Misdemeanor. On July 3 1,2006, Mr. Martin caused a Motion to
Suppress and Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, to be filed. That
same date, the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Valley County, Magistrate's
Division, heard oral arguments on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
After hearing testimony, the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law
on the record, denying Mr. Martin's motion. (Tr. p. 5, L. 15 - Tr. p. 7, L. 18). On October 20,
2006, the Defendant caused to be filed a Conditional Guilty Plea, in which he expressly reserved
his right to appeal the Magistrate Division's denial of his Motion to Suppress. See Rule 1l(a)(2),
Idaho Criminal Rules (I.C.R.). On November 30,2006, the Defendant's Conditional Guilty Plea
was accepted and a Judgment of Conviction and Sentence was entered in said matter. The
Defendant thereafter filed a timely Notice of Appeal, pursuant to Rule 54.4 Idaho Criminal Rules
(I.C.R.).

On June 18, 2008, the District Court issued a Meinorandum Decision and Order,
affirming the trial court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Subsequently on July
to
30,2008, the Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court pursua~~t
Idaho Appellate Rule 11(c)(10) (I.A.R.).
Statement of ~ a c t s '

On April 24,2006, Mr. Christopher Martin was operating a white Ford pickup,
northbound on State Highway 55, in Valley County, State of Idaho. (Tr. p. 2, L. 22 - p. 3, L. 3).
While not the registered owner, Mr. Martill had specific authorized permission from the owner to
be operating the vehicle. (Tr. p. 3., Ls. 4-9; Tr. p. 6., Ls. 8-11). Also seated in the Ford vehicle
was the registered owner, Stacey Claus. (Tr. p. 3., Ls. 10-12; Tr. p. 6, Ls. 8-1 1).
At some point contemporaneous, Trooper Sherbondy, Idaho State Police, effectuated a
traffic stop of the vehicle Mr. Martin was operating. (Tr. p. 2, L. 22; Tr. p. 5, Ls. 20-25).
Trooper Sherbondy's sole basis for the stop was that the front license plate of the Ford pickup
was displayed at an angle to the plane of the road surface. (Tr. p. 3, Ls. 13-15; Tr. p. 6, Ls. 5-8).
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Martin stipulated that the front license plate was crooked
and it was secured by one bolt. (Tr. p. 3, Ls. 16-25). Further, by and through counsel, Mr.
Martin stipulated to the State's assertion that the license plate was displayed at a 30 degree angle
to the plane of the road surface. (Tr. p. 4, Ls. 3-5).

I

Previous to the instant case, undersigned counsel had filed a Motion to Suppress in Slate ofIdaho v. Joshua Ray,
Valley County Case No. CR-2006-541-C, upon the same grounds and argument presented herein. As of July ? I ,
2006, the trial court had issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to Mr. Ray's Motion to
Suppress. Consequently, counsel for the State of Idaho and Mr. Martin (who were both counsel of record in Stale v.
Joshua Ray) stipulated to the facts pertinent to Mr. Mastin's Motion.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether a law enforcement officer who merely observes a front license plate hanging at
angle to the plane of the road surface, possesses reasonable and articulable suspicion to
conclude that the vehicle is being operated contrary to the mandates of Idaho Code 3 49428.

2.

Whether Idaho Code 5 49-428 is Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied to Ms. Martin's
Conduct.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review ofa decision of a district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, the record of
the trial court is examined independent of, but with due regard for, the district court's
intermediate appellate decision. State v. Reyes, 139 Idaho 502, 504 (Ct. App. 2003). "Where the
issues presented involve the constitutionality of a statute, [this Court] reviews the magistrate's
determination de novo." State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 71 1 (2003). The determination of the
meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free
review." State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322, 193 P.3d 869, 872-73 (Ct. App. 2008); citing Idaho

Cardiology Assoc., P.A. v. Idaho Physicians Network, Inc., 141 Idaho 223,225 (2005).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. Our standard distinguishes
Fourth Amendment questions of law from questions of fact. Slate v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301,
303 (Ct.App. 2002); State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852 (Ct.App. 2000); State v. Atkinson, I28
Idaho 559,561, (Ct.App. 1996); State v. McAfee, 116 Idaho 1007,1008 (Ct.App. 1989). When a
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact

which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional
principles to the facts as found. Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561.

ARGUMENT
I.

TROOPER SHERBONDY LACKED REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION TO CONCLUDE TI-IAT MR. MARTIN WAS OPERATING HIS
VEHICLE CONTRARY TO THE TRAFFIC LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO.
"A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and

implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, as
applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653
(1979); State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561 (Ct. App. 1996). "Under the Fourth Amendment,

an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws." United States v.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1,417 (1981); State v. Flowers; 131 Idaho 205,208 (Ct. App. 1998).
"This reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause, but move than

speculation ov instinct on the part of an officer." State v. Naccarato, 126 Idaho 10, 12 (Ct. App.
1994) (emphasis added). "The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the
totality of the circumstances at the time of the stop." State v. Ferveira, 133 Idaho 474,483 (Ct.
App. 1999). "Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer
fell within the broad range of what can be described as norntal driving behavior." Atkinson, 128
Idaho at 561 (emphasis added); citing State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664 (Ct. App. 1991).
"It is the State's burden to demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a stop." State v. Kimball,
141 Idaho 489,111 P.3d 625,627 (2005) (emphasis added). "In Fourth Amendment

applications, the reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard." Id;
citing State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288,291 (1 995). "[The courts] examine whether 'the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . would warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." Id.; citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
22 (1968).
Subjective good faith "is not enough." Kimhall, 1 11 P.3d at 628. "If subjective good
faith were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people
would be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, only in the discretion of the
police." Id. at 628-29; citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
A.

Mr. Martin's License Plate was Disvlayed in Accordance with the
Unambiguous Re~uirementsof I.C. 6 49-428.

The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held "where the language of a statue is plain
and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction. State v. Rhode, 113 Idaho 459,462 (1999); citing Slate v. McCoy, 128
Idaho 362,365 (1996). "The language of the statute is to be given its plain, obvious, and rational
meaning." State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659 (1999). "If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the courts to resort to legislative history or rules of
statutory interpretation." State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389 (Ct. App. 2000). "Unless the
result is palpably absurd, this Court assumes that the legislature meant what is clearly stated in
the statute." State v. Knott, 132 Idaho 476,478 (1999); citing Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298,299
(1986).

If the statute were in fact ambiguous to some degree, a strict construction of such would
still support Mr. Martin's position. "Where ambiguity exists as to the elements or potential
sanctions of a crime this Court will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the
defendant." Knott, 132 Idaho at 478 (1999); citing State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,437
(1980). As noted in State v. Culbreth, this has been explained by the Idaho Supreme Court as
follows:

A statute defining a crime must be sufficiently explicit so that all persons subject
thereto may know what conduct on their part will subject them to its penalties. A
criminal statute must give a clear and unmistakable warning as to the acts which
will subject one to criminal punishment, and courts are without power to supply
what the legislature has left vague. An act cannot be held as criminal under a
statue unless it clearly appears from the language used that the legislature so
intended.
193 P.3d at 873; citing State v. Hahn, 92 Idaho 265 (1968).
Title 49, Chapter 4, regulates motor vehicle registration. Specifically, I.C. 5 49-428
governs the display of license plate and registration stickers. I.C. 5 49-428 states in part:
(1) License plates assigned to a motor vehicle shall be attached, one in the front
and the other in the rear, with exception of the following: . . .
(2) Every license plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to
which ia is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging, be at a height not
less than twelve (12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of
the plate, be in a place and position to be clearly visible, and shall be
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible,
and all registration stickers shall be securely attached to the license plates
and shall be displayed as provided in section 49-443(4), Idaho Code.
(emphasis added) (1998). Thus, to colnply with Title 49, Chapter 4, a license plate must be
displayed in the folfowing fashion: ( I ) securely fastened to prevent it from swinging, (2) twelve

inches or more above ground level, (3) clearly visible, (4) clearly legible, and (4) all registration
stickers are securely attached.
The situation at hand is akin to that analyzed in State v. Salois. 144 Idaho 344, 160 P.3d
1279 (Ct. App. 2007). In that case, the Trooper pulled over the Defendant after observing that
the vehicle did not have a front or rear license affixed to it. Id, at 1281. Upon approaching the
vehicle, the officer discovered that a registration document was displayed in the rear window. Id.
Upon further inquiry, the officer determined that the registration document was invalid. Id.
The Court of Appeals held "the presence of a properly displayed temporary permit . . .
dispels any reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. $ 49-456(1)." Id., at 1283. The Court
noted "to hold otherwise would allow law enforcement officers of this state unfettered discretion
to stop each and every vehicle being operated with a temporary registration to 'investigate' its
validity." Id. It further noted "a temporary permit displayed in coinpliance with I.C. $ 49-423(3)
carries with it a presumption of validity, not of invalidity." Id. Unless the invalidity of the
temporary permit is obvious and discernible prior to effectuating a stop, the Court held law
enforcement may not stop a vehicle to inspect a permit. Id.
Well established cannons of statutory construction support the Defendant's position on
all fronts. At no point in these proceedings has the state set forth a factual basis for which
Trooper Sherbondy could have reasonably believed that Mr. Martin was operating his motor
vehicle in contravention of 1.C. $49-428. Although Mr. Martin does concede that his front
license plate was secured by "one bolt," no evidence has been presented to support a reasonable
conclusion that it was not prevented from swinging. Secondly, there is not a factual basis to

support a finding that Trooper Sherbondy had reasonable suspicioil to conclude that the license
plate was less than twelve inches above ground level, that it was not clearly visible, clearly
legible, or that the registration stickers were not securely attached. As in Salois, the only
information possessed by Trooper Sherbondy prior to effectuating the traffic stop was that the
license plate was "crooked." This is anything but obvious or discernible evidence of a violation
of I.C. § 49-428.
Consequently, Trooper Sherbondy lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to
conclude that Mr. Martin was operating his vehicle contrary to I.C. 5 49-428. As a result, the
seizure of Mr. Martin was unreasonable, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment of the
United State Constitution, and Art. I,
11.

8 17 of the Idaho State Constitution.

IDAHO CODE 5 49-428 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED
TO THE MR. MARTIN'S CONDUCT.

The stop of Mr. Martin's vehicle was unlawful because it was based upon a1alleged
violation of an unconstitutional statute. Due to the inherent vagueness resulting from the
Legislature's poor use of the English language, Idaho Code 5 49-428 permitted Trooper
Sherbondy in this matter to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce the requirements of said
statute.
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine is premised upon the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 179 P.3d 1084, 1086 (2008). "As
generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is

prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."

Id.; citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). "That is, due process requires that the
statute inform citizens of what the statute commands or forbids such that persons of common
intelligence are not forced to guess at the meaning of the criminal law." Id.; citing State v. Cobb,
132 Idaho 195,197 (1998).
"A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application." Id. .; citing Grayned v. City ofRockford, 4087 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1972). A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute. State v. Korsen,
138 Idaho 706,712 (2003).

A statute may be challenged as unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied to the
defendant's specific conduct. State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 179 P.3d 1084, 1086 (Ct. App.
2007). "For a 'facial vagueness' challenge to be successful, 'the complainant must demonstrate
that the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications."' Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712; citing

Village ofIfofman Estates v. Flipside, Hqffman Estates, Inc , 455 U.S. 489,497 (1982). "In
other words, the challenger must show that the enactment is invalid in toto." Id. "To succeed on
an 'as applied' vagueness challenge, a complainant must show that the statute, as applied to the
defendant's conduct, failed to provide fair notice that the defendant's conduct was proscribed or
failed to provide sufficient guidelines such that the police had unbridled discretion in

determining whether to arrest him." Id. ' X 'facial vagueness' analysis is mutually exclusive
from an 'as applied' analysis." Id.
For the purposes of appeal, the Defendant will concede that there are conceivably
plausible scenarios in which an otherwise "fastened license plate" runs afoul of the proscriptions
contained in I.C. 5 49-428(2). Thus, for the sake of argument, the Defendant will constrain his
focus to an "as applied" vagueness challenge.
Idaho Code 5 49-428 is unconstitutionally vague in this matter because it states "securely
fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned to prevent the plate from swinging," but fails to
define how a person of ordinary intelligence is to comply with such. Both parties have stipulated
that the license plate on Mr. Martin's vehicle on the day in question was somewhat skewed to the
plane of the road surface. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that Mr. Martin's license
plate was swinging at anytime pertinent hereto. The State's argument essentially amounts to a
presupposition that since Mr. Martin's license plate was crooked, it must have swung at some
point, and therefore was not in compliance with the requirements of I.C. 3 49-428.
Idaho Code 5 49-428 fails to define how a license plate is to be "securely fastened to the
vehicle," nor does it define which type of swinging it is aimed at preventing. When the statute
was codified, the evil that the Legislature sought to avoid could have been one of two things: (I)
swinging of license plates parallel to the lane of traffic, or (2) swinging of license plates
perpendicular to the lane of traffic. After a person of ordinary intelligence has read the text of
I.C. 5 49-428, it would require a divine epiphany to surmise the Legislature's intent. If the
Legislature intended that all license plates be securely fastened with two, three, or four bolts, it

could have easily said as much. That was not case, and consequently Idaho Code § 49-428 has
allowed law enforcement to arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce its requirements as against
Mr. Martin.
Finally and lastly, it does not appear that the statute at hand has received any judicial
attention since its codification in 1988.' As noted in State v. Wees, "authoritative judicial
construction of an otherwise vague statute may provide persons with sufficient notice to pass
constitutional muster." 138 Idaho 119 (Ct. App. 2002). As this is not the case, Mr. Martin
cannot be deemed with knowledge, constructive or otherwise, of any inconsistent judicial
declarations relating to Idaho Code 5 49-428.

CONCLUSION
For ihe foregoing reasons, Mr. Martin respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
reverse the Magistrate Division's Order denying his Motion to Suppress, and remand this matter
for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

&k

of December 2008.
HALqIN LAW, PLLC

By:
A<torney for D e f e n d a n ~ ~ ~ ~ e l l a n t

The statute was referenced in a footnote in State v. Champagne, 137 Idaho 677, n.1 (Ct. App. 2002).
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